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ABSTRACT: In a participatory democracy where every vote counts, voters expect that every vote will be counted. 
The voting machine is the instrument with which the voting public records its intent and appoints its representatives. 
In order for the democratic process to function, voting machines must properly function.
Do electronic voting systems that rely on touchscreens work better at reducing undervote and overvote counts than 
optical scan systems? To answer this question, an analysis of undervote and overvote counts in the 2002 and 2006 
Florida Gubernatorial elections was conducted. The undervote and overvote counts across county, voting system, 
system manufacturer, and election cycle were compared. Mean comparison analyses suggest that counties that primarily 
used touchscreen technology on Election Day had lower voter error rates than counties using optical scan technology 
in the 2006 election. Touchscreen technology is associated with less overvoting. Overall, voter error rates were found 
to be higher in the 2006 election than in the 2002 election for optical scan ballots but not for touchscreen systems. 
Republication not permitted without written consent of the author.
Are Touch Screens the Solution?
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines voter error across Florida’s 67 
counties in the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial elections in 
order to analyze and explain any changes in voter error as 
represented by undervotes and overvotes across electronic 
voting systems. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA) established a program to provide states with 
funds to replace punch card voting systems following 
the 2000 elections. Many argue that some voters were 
disenfranchised due to poorly designed voting equipment 
that year (Agresti and Presnell, 2002; Herron and Sekhon, 
2003).  HAVA passage prompted the enactment of many 
state laws to facilitate its implementation.
HAVA was meant to re-establish voter confidence in 
the democratic process. Elections are one of the most 
important institutions in a participatory democracy. In 
a system in which every vote should count, voters expect 
that every vote will be counted.  The voting machine is 
the instrument with which the voting public records its 
intent and appoints its representatives. For the democratic 
process to function, voting machines must properly 
function. Voting systems that are associated with lower 
voter error ensure public confidence. The integrity of the 
democratic process is based on the reliability, accuracy, 
and verifiability of voting systems, and low voter error is 
an indictor of these factors.  
Florida Statutes (F. S.) (Section 101.595) mandate that 
each county Supervisor of Elections report the total 
number of undervotes and overvotes in the first race that 
appears on an election ballot to the Florida Department 
of State. Pursuant to F.S. Section 97.021, an overvote 
means that a voter designates more than one answer to 
an office or ballot question, while an undervote shows 
that no choice is properly designated for an office or 
ballot question. In either case, a vote is not recorded 
for that office or ballot question. F.S. Section 102.141 
mandates a manual recount if a candidate is defeated 
or eliminated by one-half of one percent or less of the 
total votes cast for that office.  However, if the number 
of undervotes, overvotes, and provisional ballots is fewer 
than the number of votes needed to change the election 
outcome, a recount may not be ordered. In races where 
the outcome may be determined by just a few hundred 
votes, the need to reduce error is apparent.
Recent history shows Florida’s election process to be 
contentious and marked with controversy (Yang and 
Gaines, 2004). Hanging, pregnant, and dimpled chads in 
the 2000 election, coupled with the more recent incidence 
of high undervoting in the Congressional District 13 
race where a recount was rendered impossible due to the 
lack of a verified voter paper trail for touchscreen systems 
(Wegner, 2007), has resulted in growing concerns over the 
reliability and lack of transparency in touchscreen voting 
systems.  The Florida legislature passed H.B. 537, which 
requires that all voting be by marksense ballot (optical 
scan ballot) with exceptions for disabled persons.  This 
law, which takes effect on January 1, 2008, will reduce 
the total number of counties using touchscreen machines 
to 14 while it brings the total number of counties with 
voter-verified paper record legislation (VVPR) to 30. 
Twenty counties do not require VVPR (including the 
14 that still use touchscreens).  My findings may be 
applicable to those 14 counties that continue using 
touchscreen systems.
The electronic voting systems used in Florida for the 
2002 and 2006 elections were based either on optical 
scan or on touchscreen technologies. These machines 
were manufactured by one of three companies: Election 
Systems & Software (ES&S), Diebold, or Sequoia. 
Following the 2002 elections, only one county made 
changes to its voting system: Baker County switched 
from Sequoia Optech to Diebold Marksense systems 
(Florida Department of State: Division of Elections, 
2003). These two systems use the same optical scan 
technology but are produced by different manufacturers. 
In the 2006 election cycle, 11 counties used ES&S 
iVotronic systems software while four counties used 
Sequoia EDGE systems. These systems are touchscreen-
based direct-recording electronic voting systems (DRE). 
Counties using touchscreen systems also provided optical 
scan ballots to absentee voters.
In the 2006 election cycle, 31 counties used Diebold 
Accuvote systems, 14 counties used ES&S M100 
systems, and seven counties used ES&S Optech systems 
(Florida Department of State: Division of Elections, 
2007), all of which use optical scan technology.  These 
counties supplemented their optical scan systems with 
touchscreen systems for both early and Election Day 
voting in order to accommodate voters with special needs 
in accordance with HAVA.
HAVA established federal standards for voting systems 
used in federal elections. These same systems are used in 
Florida’s elections, resulting in federal election standards 
impacting state races. HAVA requires that voting systems 
be accessible for individuals with disabilities in a manner 
that provides them with the same access and participation 
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afforded to other voters. HAVA also requires that at least 
one direct recording electronic voting system or other 
voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities 
be present at each polling place.
Fifty-two of sixty-seven counties used optical scan 
systems in the 2002 election cycle. Of these, 51 counties 
used the same provider in 2002 and 2006. All 15 
touchscreen counties used the same provider in 2002 
and 2006. The technology used in Florida counties from 
2002 to 2006 stayed constant, with the exceptions of the 
introduction of touchscreen systems to supplement the 
optical scan systems in 52 counties, the provider change 
in Baker County, and ballot design changes made by 
individual counties.  The statistical comparison of under- 
and overvotes in the empirical analyses is facilitated by so 
many counties using the same system across elections. 
Touchscreen systems are programmed to prevent 
overvoting while they notify voters when they have 
undervoted or skipped a ballot item. Optical scan paper 
ballots rely on voters to check their own ballot for errors. 
Counties using precinct tabulation systems can tabulate 
votes immediately and notify voters of any errors, who 
may then recast their votes using a new ballot. Lower 
overvoting resulted in both the 2002 and 2006 elections 
when compared with previous election cycles (Knack 
and Kropf, 2003). However, such tabulation systems are 
an incomplete safeguard, as counties using optical scan 
systems still have some tabulation error resulting from 
Election Day overvoting. 
Focusing on gubernatorial elections provides a 
standardized variable for measuring voter error. Lower 
level races may be affected by voter roll-off (Darcy and 
Schneider, 1989), with voters abstaining from voting 
in those races listed toward the end of the ballot. The 
gubernatorial race was first on the ballot for both 2002 
and 2006 for all counties. Roll-off effects should have 
the least impact on the gubernatorial race, allowing 
for a more accurate comparison of the effects of voting 
technology on voter error across counties.
In this paper, undervote and overvote counts are compared 
by election cycle and by county to analyze trends in voter 
or tabulation error across voting technologies. The error 
rate for absentee ballots is also compared across counties 
and election cycles.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous research has focused on voter error rates caused 
by punchcard machines (Knack and Kropf, 2003) across 
various demographic groups (Alvarez and Sinclair, 
2004). These studies focused on mechanical voting 
systems because they were the most prevalent voting 
system prior to HAVA. Prior research also shows that 
lever machines and fill-in ovals (the same technology on 
which optical scan is based) have much lower error rates 
than punchcard systems (Bullock, 2002).
These studies find that, when using punchcard systems, 
African-American and Hispanic voters show higher 
voter error rates compared to White voters. However, 
such patterns were not evident where counties used 
voting equipment that was programmed to eliminate 
overvoting. Further, larger counties and counties with a 
higher percent of high school graduates showed lower 
voter and tabulation error rates.
Optical scan ballots contribute to a black-white voter 
error gap (the difference between the average voter error 
rates between blacks and whites) of 4-6% (Tomz and 
Houweling, 2003). Electronic machines, which prevent 
overvoting and make undervoting more noticeable and 
correctable, have been found to cut such discrepancies 
by a factor of ten (Tomz and Houweling, 2003). 
However, a 2001 Caltech/MIT study found that voter 
and tabulation error is highest among counties using 
electronic machines and punch cards, while it is lowest 
among counties using lever machines, optical scan paper 
ballots, and hand-counted ballots (Caltech/MIT, 2001). 
The researchers conclude that some ballot formats are 
more confusing than others. Precincts with higher 
proportions of African-American and elderly citizens 
are especially impacted by confusing ballot arrangements 
(Schneider, 1989).
The accuracy and risk associated with electronic voting 
machines (Foster, 2004) continues to be a subject of 
academic debate. Computer science experts express 
concern over the vulnerability of DRE machines 
(including touchscreen) that lack a voter verified paper 
trail (Barr and Gondree, 2007). However, the Caltech/
MIT Voting Technology Project argues that the 2004 
elections went relatively smoothly as electronic voting 
machines record votes more accurately than paper ballots 
(Foster, 2004). Election accuracy cannot be independently 
verified in states that use DRE technology without 
verified voter paper trails even with an available source 
code (Barr and Gondree, 2007). Touchscreen counties 
in Florida shared this experience in both the 2002 and 
2006 elections.
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HYPOTHESES
1. What is the effect of technology 
type on voter error?
Hypothesis 1: Counties that use touchscreen voting 
systems will have lower voter error rates than counties 
that use optical scan voting systems. Touchscreens were 
the sole means of voting in 15 counties on Election Day 
and for early voting in 2002 and 2006; all else being equal, 
these counties should have lower voter error rates, even 
when absentee ballots are included in the total error rate. 
This hypothesis notes that touchscreen systems allow for 
additional safeguards against voter error, while optical 
scan paper ballots require voters to review their own 
ballots and correct mistakes. Overvoting rates should 
not be a significant proportion of the total voter error 
rate. Undervoting rates should be very similar to the total 
voter error rate in touchscreen counties, but not in optical 
scan counties. It is predicted that the undervote should 
be the primary contributor to the total voter error rate.
Hypothesis 2: Touchscreen counties and optical scan 
counties will have similar undervoting rates for absentee 
voting. Both touchscreen and optical scan counties use 
the same technology for absentee voting.  If technology 
is the primary voter error factor, there should be no 
difference in error rates for absentee ballots emanating 
from different counties. Voters in touchscreen counties 
should be equally likely to undervote as voters in optical 
scan counties.
Hypothesis 3: For absentee voting, touchscreen counties 
will have similar rates of overvoting as optical scan 
counties. Absentee ballots have no safeguard to prevent 
overvoting, other than the voters’ ability to properly 
review their ballots and correct overvoting.
Optical scan paper ballots are used for absentee voting in 
all 67 Florida counties, although it should be noted that 
the design of those ballots and ballot instructions might 
vary by county and ballot manufacturer. Optical scan 
ballots normally require that voters complete an arrow, 
or fill in an oval, in order to designate a ballot choice. If 
an error is made when marking an optical scan ballot, it 
is the voter’s responsibility to identify the error and make 
corrections or request a new ballot. When the voter has 
completed an absentee ballot, it must either be mailed 
or delivered to the Supervisor of Elections office in the 
county of residence no later than 7 p.m. on Election 
Day. This means that absentee voters who fail to correct 
errors on their optical scan ballots risk having their votes 
voided for that particular office or question.  It would be 
too late to make a correction once the ballot tabulator 
detects an error.
2. What effect does the manufacturer of 
the voting system have on voter error?
Hypothesis 4: The rate of voter error for the ES&S 
optical scan system will be similar to the voter error rate 
for Diebold optical scan systems. The equipment used 
limits ballot design; both Diebold and ES&S optical 
scan systems use the same technology. If counties have 
correctly designed ballots, the difference in ballot design 
afforded by these two different systems should not be 
significant enough to cause a gap in the rate of voter 
error between them,.
Hypothesis 5: The voter error rate for ES&S touchscreen 
systems will be similar to the voter error rate for Sequoia 
touchscreen systems in touchscreen counties. Again, 
touchscreen systems are limited in their effectiveness by 
their physical design and programming. The difference in 
effectiveness between systems should not be significant 
enough to create a gap in the voter error rate between 
them. However, voters and counties unfamiliar with 
touchscreen technology may have higher voter error 
rates.
Hypothesis 6: The undervoting rate for touchscreen 
systems will be higher in optical scan (blended) 
counties than in 100% touchscreen counties in 2006. 
Counties that supplement their optical scan ballots with 
touchscreens to accommodate voters with special needs 
or provide an alternative to paper ballots to some voters 
will have higher voter error rates. These higher error rates 
may result from the lack of experience with touchscreen 
systems in counties that have only recently added the 
new technology. With new technology comes the need 
to retrain poll workers and educate voters.  It may take 
some time before such retraining efforts reduce voter 
error. During this learning curve period, voter error may 
be higher for these counties than for counties that have 
been using touchscreen technology for several elections. 
As previous studies suggest, voter error is associated 
with voter familiarity with the polling technology in use 
(Knack and Kropf, 2003).
METHODOLOGY
Data is collected from the Florida Division of Elections 
and from the Supervisors of Elections offices across the 
state in order to construct the variables employed. The 
following is a list of independent and dependent variables, 
along with the operationalization of those variables. The 
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county is the unit of analysis. Data on all variables is 
calculated independently for the gubernatorial elections 
of 2002 and 2006, and by county.
Independent Variables
The Voting System was created as a nominal variable and 
was coded as follows: Diebold Marksense, ES&S 100, 
ES&S Touchscreen, Sequoia Touchscreen, and ES&S 
Optech. Baker County was coded as Diebold Marksense 
for both 2002 and 2006; the Sequoia Optech system 
performed the same in 2006 as similar Marksense 
systems in Baker County in 2002 (Florida Division of 
Elections, 2003).
Technology is also a nominal level variable and is defined 
as Optical Scan or Touchscreen.
Manufacturer is also a nominal level variable and is 
measured as Diebold, ES&S, or Sequoia.
Dependent Variables
Percent Undervote Absentee 2002 is a ratio level variable, 
constructed by taking the total number of absentee ballots 
with an undervote and dividing by the total number of 
ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by county.
Percent Overvote Absentee 2002 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of absentee 
ballots with an overvote and dividing by the total number 
of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by county.
Percent Undervote Precinct 2002 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of ballots cast on 
Election Day with an undervote and dividing by the total 
number of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated by 
county.
Percent Overvote Precinct 2002 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of ballots cast on 
Election Day with an overvote and dividing by the total 
number of ballots cast in the 2002 election, calculated 
by county.
Percent Total Undervote and Overvote 2002 is a ratio 
level variable constructed by taking the sum of all ballots 
(absentee and precinct) with an undervote or an overvote 
and dividing by the total number of ballots cast in the 
2002 elections, calculated by county.
Percent Undervote Absentee 2006 is a ratio level dependent 
variable constructed by taking the total number of 
absentee ballots with an undervote and dividing by 
the total number of ballots cast in the 2006 election, 
calculated by county.
Percent Overvote Absentee 2006 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of absentee 
ballots with an overvote and dividing by the total number 
of ballots cast in the 2006 election, calculated by county.
Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of undervotes for 
non-absentee ballots and dividing by the total votes cast 
in the 2006 election in a given county. For optical scan 
counties that blend technology, the percent undervote 
from touchscreen voting is not included to make the 
variable consistent with its 2002 counterpart. This 
variable allows precinct ballots cast in a county to be 
either 100% touchscreen or optical scan.
Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 Touchscreen is a ratio 
level variable constructed by taking the total number of 
undervotes cast on touchscreen systems and dividing by 
the total votes cast, calculated by county for the 2006 
gubernatorial election. This variable was constructed for 
all 67 counties; in optical scan the percent was calculated 
as the total undervote on touchscreen ballots divided by 
total votes cast on touchscreen ballots in that optical scan 
county. 
Percent Overvote Precinct 2006 is a ratio level variable 
constructed by taking the total number of overvotes 
for optical scan systems and dividing by the total votes 
cast. For touchscreen counties, a value of 0 was entered 
(touchscreens are programmed to eliminate overvotes). 
For touchscreen counties, this variable represents the 
percent of overvotes produced by touchscreen systems. 
For optical scan counties (blended), this variable 
represents the percent of overvotes produced by optical 
scan systems (the only system capable of producing 
overvotes that is currently used in Florida counties).
Percent Total Undervote and Overvote 2006 is a ratio level 
variable constructed by taking the total number of ballots 
with undervotes and overvotes (including absentee and 
touchscreens in blended counties), and dividing by 
the total votes cast, calculated by county. This variable 
represents the sum of the total percent of undervotes 
and overvotes in a given county for both optical scan and 
touchscreen ballots in 2006.
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ANALYSIS
Hypothesis 1: Table 1 shows the mean comparison 
for percent of undervote and overvote for precinct 
cast ballots, and for the percent of total voter error 
for all ballots for the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial 
elections. Counties using touchscreen technology have 
lower voter error rates than counties using optical scan 
systems for 2006, but the hypothesized relation does 
not hold true for the 2002 election cycle. According to 
the independent-sample t-test, the mean difference is 
not statistically significant at the .05 level for the total 
overvotes and undervotes in the 2006 elections; there is 
no significant relation between total voter error and the 
voting technology used.
In the 2002 elections, touchscreen systems were still a 
relatively new voting technology. Voters would have 
been more familiar with systems designed around paper 
ballots such as optical scan systems. The higher mean 
percent error for touchscreen systems as compared to 
optical scan systems may have been due to the lack of 
voter familiarity with touchscreen voting systems. The 
decrease in the mean for total error for touchscreen 
systems of .047 may have been due to increased voter 
familiarity with touchscreen systems gained between the 
2002 and 2006 election cycle, although the difference is 
not statistically significant.
Counties that use touchscreen voting systems have 
lower overvoting rates than optical scan counties. This 
relation between voting technology and overvoting is 
supported by the mean comparison for 2002, but the 
mean difference is not significant for the 2006 election 
(Table 1). The mean for touchscreen counties in both 
2002 and 2006 was 0 percent, resulting from the fact 
that touchscreen systems have been programmed to 
eliminate overvoting by preventing the voter from 
designating more than the allowed number of choices for 
a given ballot question. Optical scan ballots do not have 
the same stringent safeguards as touchscreen systems 
to prevent overvoting. The lack of safeguards and the 
reliance on voters to correct their own mistakes leads to 
the gap in overvoting between these two systems. There 
was no statistically significant relation between voting 
technology and overvoting for the 2006 election; this 
lack may be the result of several factors, including the use 
of precinct tabulators at polling sites using optical scan 
ballots in 2006. As predicted, overvoting in the 2002 and 
2006 elections was not a major contributor to the overall 
rate of voter error in both optical scan and touchscreen 
counties.
There was no statistically significant relationship between 
voting technology and undervoting for the mean 
comparison table (Table 1). According to the t-test, the 
mean difference is not statistically significant for the 
percent undervote in the 2006 election, and optical scan 
counties actually had a lower mean voter error rate in the 
2002 election. The undervote was the most significant 
contributor to overall voter error for both election cycles 
as predicted. Between the 2002 and 2006 elections, the 
mean percent error for overvoting on touchscreen systems 
did fall by .047 percent, and the mean percent error for 
voting on optical scan systems increased by a mean 
difference of .4769 percent. The decreased undervoting 
on touchscreen systems between election cycles may 
have been a product of increased voter familiarity and 
awareness of the various safeguards that prompt the 
voter to correct undervoting on touchscreen systems. 
The increase in undervoting between election cycles may 
have been caused by numerous factors, including voter 
confusion or disinterest in the gubernatorial race.
Hypothesis 2: Table 2 shows the mean comparison for 
the percent of overvotes and undervotes for absentee 
ballots in the 2002 and 2006 election cycles. The 
hypothesized relationship between undervoting on 
absentee ballots and the primary voting systems used 
on Election Day was supported by the data for the 
2002 election, but not for the 2006 election. The mean 
difference for percent undervotes in the 2006 election 
was statistically significant according to the t-test; the 
mean difference was not significant for the 2002. The 
mean difference for the percent undervoting on absentee 
ballots in 2002 was .0892 percent, more than the mean 
for undervoting on absentee ballots in touchscreen 
counties in 2002. The mean difference for undervoting 
on absentee ballots in 2006 was .4664, almost one-half 
of one percent. F.S. Section 102.141 mandates a manual 
recount if a candidate is defeated or eliminated by one-
half of a percent or less.
The gap in undervoting on absentee ballots between 
touchscreen and optical scan counties, which use the 
same technology for absentee ballots, may be explained 
by ballot design and voter experience. Touchscreen 
counties are more urbanized and have more voters than 
optical scan counties. Previous studies have suggested 
that urbanized and larger counties have lower voter 
error rates in general compared to smaller, less urbanized 
counties.
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Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized relationship between 
overvoting on absentee ballots and the primary voting 
system used on Election Day was supported by the data 
(Table 2). The mean difference for overvotes in the 2002 
and 2006 elections was not statistically significant. As 
hypothesized, there was no relation between overvoting 
on absentee ballots and voting technology used in a 
county. The mean difference for overvoting on absentee 
ballots for the 2002 gubernatorial election was .0032; 
this difference is not very meaningful, although it 
may be worth noting that optical scan counties had a 
higher error rate.  The mean difference for overvoting on 
absentee ballots in 2006 was .0111.  The mean difference 
is not meaningful, at only one-hundredth of one percent 
in 2006 and less than one-hundredth of one percent 
in 2002. If a recount were ordered, the voter error for 
overvotes on absentee ballots would have little effect on 
the outcome.
Hypothesis 4: The hypothesized relationship between 
voter error for ES&S and Diebold optical scan systems 
is supported by the data for the 2002 election, but not 
for the 2006 election (Table 4). The mean differences for 
overvotes in the 2002 and 2006 election were statistically 
significant according to the t-test. The mean difference 
for undervotes and total voter error was statistically 
significant in the 2002 election, but was not significant 
for the 2006 election. ES&S optical scan systems do 
not produce error rates similar to Diebold optical scan 
systems, as ES&S systems produce higher average rates 
of both overvotes and undervotes. The mean difference 
for total undervotes and overvotes in 2002 for the two 
systems was .5426 and in 2006, it was .2995. For both 
election cycles, ES&S systems produce higher undervote 
rates. Clearly, not all manufacturers provide equally 
accurate systems. Different systems have different 
restrictions on ballot designs. These restrictions can lead 
to poorly designed ballots. Poorly designed and confusing 
ballots can increase voter error as suggested by numerous 
studies.
Hypothesis 5: The hypothesized relationship between 
voter error for ES&S and Sequoia touchscreen systems 
is supported by the data (See Table 4). The mean 
differences for undervotes and total voter error were 
statistically significant for both 2002 and 2006; there 
is no relation between voter error and manufacturer for 
touchscreen systems. The mean difference for the percent 
total undervote and overvote in 2002 was .0373, and in 
2002, it was .0061. The mean differences are too small 
to be meaningful; such differences are unlikely to have 
an effect on the outcome of a recount. In 2002, ES&S 
systems produced a higher mean percent voter error. In 
2006, Sequoia systems produced a higher mean percent 
voter error. The voter error rates for touchscreen systems 
are very similar for both manufacturers. Touchscreen 
systems have fewer limits in terms of ballot designs than 
do optical scan systems and can therefore be standardized 
across manufacturers to produce similarly low voter error 
rates.
Hypothesis 6: The hypothesized relationship between 
undervoting rates on touchscreen ballots in optical scan 
and touchscreen counties was not supported by the data 
(Table 3). The mean difference according to the t-test for 
undervoting for touchscreen systems for all counties was 
not statistically significant for the 2006 election, although 
the mean difference for undervoting on touchscreen 
ballots between optical scan and touchscreen counties was 
.424 , almost one-half of one percent. This difference may 
be explained by lack of voter familiarity with touchscreen 
systems in counties that previously used only optical scan 
ballots. For touchscreen counties, a decline in voter error 
was found between the 2002 and 2006 election cycles for 
the gubernatorial race. As voters become more familiar 
with the new technology, and as poll workers gain more 
experience helping voters navigate new equipment, error 
rates may continue to decline.
CONCLUSIONS
Are touchscreens the solution? Perhaps.  Touchscreens 
fared better than optical scan systems in 2006 for 
touchscreen counties in terms of voter error reduction, 
but many of the mean differences were not significant. 
The fact that the percent undervoting on touchscreen 
systems was higher in optical scan counties than in 
touchscreen counties, and higher than undervoting on 
optical scan ballots, points to a possible learning curve for 
touchscreen systems. Touchscreen counties experienced a 
slight decline in mean percent voter error between 2002 
and 2006.  It is possible that this trend will continue with 
increased voter education programs in states still using 
touchscreen systems. From 2002 to 2006, optical scan 
systems experienced an increase in total voter error due 
to increased undervoting on optical scan ballots.
Touchscreens eliminated overvoting on Election Day in 
15 of Florida’s 67 counties. That fact alone can be seen as 
a small victory for the technology; however, overvoting 
is not as important in determining the outcome of an 
election as the undervote is.  Touchscreen systems, if fully 
utilized, may one day help to render undervoting a non-
2: 1–18
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issue. However, the accuracy of these systems can only be 
confirmed if they are equipped with voter verified paper 
trails to make it possible for an independent recount to 
be held.
For optical scan systems, not all manufacturers are 
created equal (or at least do not provide equally accurate 
systems). ES&S optical scan systems have higher mean 
percent undervotes, overvotes, and total voter error rates 
as compared to Diebold optical scan systems. Thus, the 
manufacturer should be a factor when selecting a voting 
system.  If counties should reinvest in optical scan systems, 
it may be wise to consider manufacturers carefully in 
order to ensure the best experience for voters.
In terms of touchscreen systems, the manufacturer seems 
to be of little consequence when comparing Sequoia 
and ES&S machines. Both systems produce a similar 
mean percent voter error. The main disadvantage to 
touchscreen systems used in Florida was the lack of a 
voter verified paper trail, which made it impossible to 
conduct independent recounts.
Absentee voters in touchscreen counties fared better in 
recording their intent than did voters residing in optical 
scan counties for the 2006 election cycle. This curious 
phenomenon can be explained by previous studies, which 
have found that large urbanized counties have lower error 
rates (Sinclair and Alvarez, 2004). Touchscreen county 
populations are, on average, larger and more urban than 
are optical scan counties.
Finally, touchscreens were increasingly becoming the 
system of choice for many counties. This was due in part 
to new FEC and HAVA regulations, which emphasize 
reducing voter error through improved technology. 
However, touchscreens still have many limits and with 
the current legislative ban will have a very marginal 
place in the electoral landscape. These limits include 
overheating, a vulnerability to hackers, and the lack of a 
verifiable paper trail.
Many newer versions of DRE machines are equipped 
with printers allowing for a verifiable paper trail. As 
touchscreen technology develops and these issues are 
resolved, it may reappear in Florida, if changes are 
made to the legislative framework. As consumers, 
counties should continue to demand more from voting 
equipment manufacturers to produce auditable systems 
that can be easily tailored to a county’s needs. Voter error 
may never be a thing of the past, but it can at least be 
rendered inconsequential through better ballot design 
and technology. The bottom line of any election is the 
accurate interpretation of the voting public’s intent; 
therefore, whatever technology a county chooses to 
use, that technology must have safeguards to ensure the 
highest standards for our democracy.
2: 42–59
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APPENDIX - TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Mean Comparison for Percent Undervote and Overvote for Precinct 
Ballots, and Percent Total Undervote and Overvote in 2002 and 2006 by Technology.
Optical Scan or 
Touchscreen
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 
2002*
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 
2002*
Percent 
Total 
Undervote 
and 
Overvote 
2002*
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 
2006
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 
2006*
Percent 
Total 
Undervote 
and 
Overvote 
2006
Optical Scan
Mean .4952 .0385 .7446 .9721 .0733 1.0810
N 52 .52 52 52 52 52
Std. 
Deviation .29323 .05367 .47120 .52182 .08798 .56850
Touchscreen
Mean .9247 .0000 1.0373 .9200 .000 .9480
N 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. 
Deviation .21464 .00000 .25550 .23649 .00000 .22288
Total
Mean .5913 .0299 .8101 .9604 .0569 1.0512
N 67 67 67 67 67 67
Std. 
Deviation .32977 .04986 .44781 .47196 .08323 .51322
* p < .05
(continued on next page)
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Sig. Sig. (2–tailed) Mean Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .286 .000 -.42947 -.59231 -.26664
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 -.42947 -.56972 -.28923
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .001 .007 .03846 .01064 .06629
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 .03846 .02352 .05340
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .053 .025 -.29272 -.54669 -.03874
Equal variances 
not assumed .003 -.29272 -.47992 -.10552
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .045 .709 .05212 -.22595 .33019
Equal variances 
not assumed .584 .05212 -.13784 .24207
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .000 .002 .07327 .02766 .11888
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 .07327 .04878 .09776
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .063 .381 .13296 -.16794 .43387
Equal variances 
not assumed .178 .13296 -.06235 .32828
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Table 2: Mean Comparison Table for Percent Undervote and Overvote 
for Absentee Ballots in the 2002 and 2006 Gubernatorial Elections
Optical Scan or Touch-
screen
Percent Under-
vote Absentee 
Ballot 2002
Percent Overvote 
Absentee Ballot 
2002
Percent Under-
vote Absentee 
Ballots 2006*
Percent Overvote 
Absentee Ballots 
2006
Optical Scan
Mean .1652 .0219 1.2317 .0958
N 52 52 52 52
Touchscreen
Mean .0760 .0187 .7653 .1067
N 15 15 15 15
Total
Mean .1452 .0212 1.1273 .0982
N 67 67 67 67
* p < .05
(Continued on next page)
2: 42–59
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Sig. Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference
Lower Upper
Percent 
Undervote 
Absentee 
Ballot 2002
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.078 .164 .08919 -.03726 .21564
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
.017 .08919 .01669 .16170
Percent 
Overvote 
Absentee 
Ballot 2002
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.076 .682 .00326 -.01255 .01906
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
.604 .00326 -.00938 .01589
Percent 
Undervote 
Absentee 
Ballots 2006
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.003 .038 .46640 .02650 .90629
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
.000 .46640 .22181 .71098
Percent 
Overvote 
Absentee 
Ballots 2006
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.653 .917 -.01090 -.21928 .19749
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
.871 -.01090 -.14427 .12247
2: 42–59
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Table 3: Mean Comparison for Touchscreen Voting in Optical Scan 
and Touchscreen Counties Percent Undervote Precinct 2006 Touchscreen
Optical Scan or Touchscreen County Mean 11
Optical Scan Counties 1.3440 52
Touchscreen Counties .9200 15
Total 1.2491 67
* p < .05
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
Sig. Sig. (2–tailed) Mean Difference
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference
Lower Upper
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 2006 
Touchscreen
Equal 
variances 
assumed
.155 .068 .42404 -1.22104 2.06912
Equal 
variances not 
assumed
.344 .42404 -.46633 1.31440
2: 42–59
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Table 4: Mean Comparison for Percent Undervote and Overvote for Percent Undervote, Overvote 
and Total Voter Error for Precinct Ballots in 2002 and 2006 by Manufacturer and Voting Technology
Manufacturer 
and 
Technology
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 
2002
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 
2002
Percent Total 
Undervote 
and Overvote 
2002
Percent 
Undervote 
Precinct 
2006
Percent 
Overvote 
Precinct 
2006
Percent Total 
Undervote 
and Overvote 
2006
Diebold 
Optical Scan
Mean .4013 0113 .5255 8616 .0326 9600
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Std. 
Deviation
.20808 .01628 .23001 .45074 .02620 .44994
ES&S Optical 
Scan
Mean .6338 .0786 1.0681 1.1352 .1333 1.2595
N 21 21 21 21 21 21
Std. 
Deviation
.34709 .06413 .55002 .58543 .11115 .68140
ES&S 
Touchscreen
Mean .9273 .0000 1.0473 .9291 .0000 .9464
N 11 11 11 11 11 11
Std. 
Deviation
.23837 .00000 .28398 .23881 .00000 .22571
Sequoia
Touchscreen
Mean .9175 .0000 1.0100 .8950 .0000 .9525
N 4 4 4 4 4 4
Std. 
Deviation
.15966 .00000 .18565 .26413 .00000 .24891
Total
Mean .5913 .0299 .8101 .9604 .0569 1.0512
N 67 67 67 67 67 67
Std. 
Deviation
.32977 .04986 .44781 .47196 .08323 .51322
(Continued on next page)
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Independent Samples Test for Diebold Optical 
Scan and ES&S Optical Scan
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances
Sig. Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Percent Undervote 
Precinct 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .286 .000 -.42947 -.59231 -.26664
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 -.42947 .56972 -.28923
Percent Overvote 
Precinct 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .001 .007 .03846 .01064 .06629
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 .03846 .02352 .05340
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .053 .025 -.29272 -.54669 -.03874
Equal variances 
not assumed .003 -.29272 -.47992 -.10552
Percent Undervote 
Precinct 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .045 .709 .05212 -.22595 .33019
Equal variances 
not assumed .584 .05212 -.13784 .24207
Percent Overvote 
Precinct 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .000 .002 .07327 .02766 .11888
Equal variances 
not assumed .000 .07327 .04878 .09776
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .063 .381 .13296 -.16794 .43387
Equal variances 
not assumed .178 .13296 -.06235 .32828
(Continued on next page)
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Independent Samples Test for ES&S 
Touchscreen and Sequoia Touchscree
Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances
Sig. Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Percent Undervote 
Precinct 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .308 .941 .00977 -.27113 .29067
Equal variances 
not assumed .930 .00977 -.23681 .25635
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2002
Equal variances 
assumed .397 .813 .03727 -.29642 .37097
Equal variances 
not assumed .775 .03727 -.25130 .32585
Percent Undervote 
Precinct 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .832 .815 .03409 -.27480 .34298
Equal variances 
not assumed .830 .03409 -.35452 .42270
Percent Total 
Undervote and 
Overvote 2006
Equal variances 
assumed .869 .964 -.00614 -.29786 .28559
Equal variances 
not assumed .967 -.00614 -.37233 .36006
2: 42–59
17
Khan: Undervoting/Overvoting in 2002/2006 Fla. Gubernatorial Elections
Published by STARS, 2006
THE UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL
59www.URJ.ucf.edu
Figure 1: Bar Graph of Means for Percent Undervote, Overvote, and 
Total Voter Error in the 2002 and 2006 Election
2: 42–59
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